Repurposed words: Context and Content

[In the hopes of continued agility of thought, and to spite mental atrophy, a present hope is to dedicate myself to writing of a substantial character. Once a week, generally on Thursdays, I will be sitting down to hash out some brief comments of varying rigor. Your mileage may vary.]

Words are undoubtedly powerful. Biblically speaking, the Word - Hebrew Dabar (), or Greek Logos (λόγος) - is centrally located. One could reasonably say, in fact, that the very essence of Christianity (and the Judaism from which it springs) lies in a theology of words: divine words given to humans from God (Inspiration/Revelation), words used by men to represent to themselves those divine words (Scripture), and words used to systematize, explore, share, and find application for those divine words (philosophical theology, mystical texts, etc.).

Socially speaking, as well, words bear power. Creating terms for systems of oppression and dismissal can serve to reinforce and legitimize them through lexical acceptance, as labels guide identity both overtly (i.e., "Illegal" vs. "Undocumented" immigrants) and subtly (i.e., the normative-neutral "White" versus the marginal and umbrella term "Colored").

This latter point may be unfamiliar to some of my readers, and - though initially I was hoping to cover this in a footnote - it is interesting to explore. You see, beyond the obvious connotations in Western societies - snow, purity, cleanness, and light - White is a generic default, aesthetically a "blank canvas". By creating Whiteness and identifying it with people of Anglo-Saxon European descent as White (rather than, say, Pink, Tan, etc.), the connotative implication is that non-Anglo/non-European persons are less of a blank slate.

I would like stress here that this is not a uniquely White, American, European, or even Western pattern, either. The same is present in modern Chinese: Anglo people are White (白人, bai + ren = white + person) [1], people of African descent are Black (黑人, hei + ren = black + person), but Chinese are 中国人, people of the middle kingdom. And humility is far from a trait of dominant cultures (Consider also the other common term for the Chinese diaspora, 华人, hua + ren = magnificent/splendid + person).

Whether identifying ourselves at the center of all things, or as White (and hence pure/unsullied/adaptable), so long as we have the power to do so, we nearly always ascribe normativity to ourselves. This is a fair move to make internally; after all, processing external input would be highly confusing were it not for the normative presumption of our own internal processes. However, to ascribe normativity to our own points of view in a broader sense overwrites and overrides the experience and authentic reflections of others, creating dissonant systems for those who are not-Us but subscribe (willingly or through coercion) to that prescription. For a majority member [2], most such suppositions pass unquestioned; but, for a minority member, it raises significant existential - even ontological - questions that express themselves as internal anguish and confusion.

Of course, words can also be recontextualized, forcefully and defiantly if need be. The homosexual community (and, increasingly, other communities as well), in accepting, embracing, and finally repurposing the label "Queer", has demonstrated, it seems, a praiseworthy amount of perseverance and deliberate, systematic, activism. It is also one of the rare examples of a community embracing marginalization, for the very etymology of the identifier names its referent as on the fringe.

The N word (as if you're going to get me to spell it out for you... get outta here) is an example of a slur with a far more controversial present usage. While some advocates of the word claim that the same process of acceptance-embrace-repurposing has been undertaken successfully, it is hard to successfully argue that the word has been rehabilitated in the same fashion as the Q word (if you would). To nudge this intuition, let me point to two pieces of evidence: first, that I am myself hesitant to type out in full "the N word", while having no such qualms about "queer" [3]. Second, the ongoing dialect debate over "the N word with a -a" and "the N word with a -er" suggests that the process of linguistic evolution and drift away from offensiveness towards repurposing is far from complete [4].

What separates the two? Without entering into a rigorous discussion, the apparent answer seems to be that "Queer" is a word that preceded its use as a slur, while the N word - though possessing a historied and not entirely negative etymology - springs up in its proximal form as a slur. When those who self-identify as Queer (or queer-allied) do so, they are actually not re-defining the word, but instead actually maintain the definition of the word while re-defining the moral landscape within which it is situated, shifting from normativity to a non-normative field. Not being queer is therefore descriptive, rather than normative, and so queerness becomes as normal as non-queerness.

My (self-)allotted time is drawing to a close and is, indeed, even now nigh. Interestingly, all the above was initially only to be a brief footnote to a larger discussion; at this point, I will turn to a summary of my intended discussion, and pick up on it when next we speak.

So, why all the thought about Words? A natural response would be: the author's hubris leads to an egotistical confluence of form and content, wherein his verbosity is buoyed by the ostensible topic of exploring the power of words.

But no.

Actually, the choice of topic upon which to spend my meagre reserves is prompted by some reflections on the recent Malaysian religious scandal. In short, Malaysian courts recently ruled that it was within the civil rights of non-Muslim organizations (read: Christian churches) and individuals to freely use the Arabic term "Allah" to refer to God - God the concept and God the being. As far as I understand, certain elements within society - pre-radicalized, and definitely not all of Muslim Malaysia [5] - seized upon this ruling as a foothold from which to launch an extremist agenda, including vigilante attacks on various Christian churches and schools.

Malaysia is, of course, a country with a complex history of diversity along ethnic, economic, and religious lines. I am ill prepared to speak on it in such fields, and thus reticent.

While the proximally inciting incident of word usage seems to be more a case of finding excuses than of actual outrage, I am still interested in the idea that word usage can be made into an excuse for action; an excuse that is, at the very least, not horrendously implausible. And even if, in this case, the implausibility of gross offense through word usage is very high, there are definitely cases - slander, defamation, and libel - in which words alone are legally acknowledged to have the power to harm and damage.

To be continued.

[1] It is undeniable that other societies also associate people of Anglo descent with the color white. An interesting study would be a linguistic excavation of Whiteness in other cultures: for example, modern Chinese refer to Anglos as White People. Was this phrase introduced by cultural transmission along with the concept of Whiteness during the opening of Sino-American relations, or does it stem from a natural response to skin tone? Consider also the association of white with death in Chinese cultures (hence, red wedding dresses and white in funeral rituals): in this case, arguments for the nonpreferential nature of white-connotative language seem to obtain more readily.

[2] Majority here, of course, does not necessarily connotate numerical majority, but instead a majority of power. As examples, the racial politics of South Africa and the religious politics of Hussein-era Iraq come to mind.

[3] This does beg the question: ought I be so free with my diction? So far as I understand, queer-sensitive allies are allowed to use this word in such contexts. I may be wrong.

[4] Naturally, as a straight Asian-American male, I am an outsider to both these debates, and I may be reading social cues entirely wrong. This raises another question: do Asian-Americans have a repurposed label? I suspect not. Why not? Interesting.

[5] I hope not to evoke a sense of the Muslim Panic all too familiar in Western rhetoric.

The question; and a thought.

The Question

After a respectable (or thereabouts) deal of reading and thought (particularly reflecting on Frank Chin's repeated critiques of Maxine Hong Kingston), this is the question that presents itself:

How to be American without being White? How to be "of Chinese descent" without slipping into reactionist sinocentrism?

Of course the cultural inheritance of The West isn't to be lightly discarded or vilified, nor is the East (or even the immigrant experience) to be mindlessly embraced and valued. The answers' typeface is far from black-and-white. But among shades of grey (not shades of greige), where does one alight?

(Hint: God is the answer. [No, this is not just a flip answer; Yes, this is still a Christian, and not only ethnic theory, blog, appearances to the contrary])

The Thought
That said, another thought occurs to me at the moment (A few minutes ago, I jokingly told a friend that tonight was my Asian-American Film Studies night): while I have previously been a proponent of the narrative-as-description(e.g., NWA's Straight Outta Compton can be justified as a descriptive, not prescriptive, outline - "not a glorification, but a presentation"), I am increasingly understanding of the need to present balanced-but-idealized portrayals in the media, serving the function of a corrective to unbalanced and two-dimensional portraits of Americans of Asian/Pacific Islander descent.

I had a fairly strong and disconcerting response to viewing, Monday night, Justin Lin's modern Asian-American crime drama Better Luck Tomorrow: there is a scene in the film, in a backyard party, where the core group of four Asian-American protagonists (portrayed as and by a varied group of Asian-American males) confront a group of White antagonists. After a brief fistfight, instigated by implicitly racial (but only indirectly racist) comments, one of the Asian-American gang pulls a gun on the lead antagonist. The subsequent beating of the White varsity athlete - leaving him bruised and bloodied, but not permanently physically harmed - both signals the core group's increasingly rapid descent into crime and materialistic excess, and foreshadows the nadir of the film, where a similar beating takes place: this time, against a spoiled Korean-American private-school kid; and this time, to the death (based on an actual incident in early-90s Southern California).

What disturbed me about my response was that, in both cases, Lim took care to portray the Asian-American protagonists as complex, well-rounded characters: morally speaking, they were on neither the high nor low ground. In both cases, there were senses of moral indignation and vindication ("getting back" at the White bullies; retaliating against the rich prep school kid who treats his girl like dirt), and also a sense of excess and transgressed boundaries.

However carefully-laid-out the mores of the film, my responses were affectively discrepant with my moral construals of the situations, and I have little choice but to admit that the distinction was likely simply because of the race of the tragic protagonists: whereas I would unhesitatingly condemn the actions in abstract, the fact that violence originating from Asian-American sources, especially against a Caucasian figure, is contradictory to my construal of the stereotype of expected Model Minority behavior (albeit a malformed and, in fact, highly inaccurate stereotype) seemed to serve as justification for my emotional consent towards the action.

This is, I willingly and mournfully agree, evidence of a shamefully akrasic mental process, the ramifications of which I'm concerned, especially regarding my vocation as a minister, a profession part of the call to which is love for the Other above the Self, love for all facets of God-created diversity, and striving on behalf of reconciliation, healing, and understanding (Gal. 3:26-29, among others). However, it is not, I would guess, a drastically atypical response to such media depicting violence from an oppressed (or, more often, nowadays, suppressed) minority directed towards the dominant majority.

One thing that I always wondered, watching the incredible HBO series The Wire, a bastion of verisimilitude and narrative-as-depiction-of-reality, was how so many Black voices (not only, or even particularly often, academic Black voices, but definitely a predominance of street voices, as seen anywhere from nahright.com to the Smoking Section) could willingly applaud explicitly villainous figures, or at least what seemed to me at the time to be: the drug lords (Marlo, Stringer, Avon), shooters (Snoop, Christ Partlow, etc.), and other Baltimore inner-city hood figures (the more complex morality of characters such as Omar Little, Bubbles, etc., is of course less cut-and-dry).

Of course, what I didn't understand at the time, on a subjective level (and am now only beginning to scratch the surface of, as I begin to analyze my personal response to depictions of violence by the oppressed), is that the characters are not usually being lauded for their actions: their actions are the signifiers of a larger motivation, that is, defying power and breaking stereotype. The problem is that reactive stereotypes - the clever, tactical, chess-piece-moving crime lord as a response to the dumb, happy, bumbling Sambo - are also a system of entrapment and limitation for minorities: we sketch out extremes, but fill in no grays, leaving room for the Huxtables and the Barksdales, but fewer and fewer Redd Foxxes in between [note: by "Redd Foxx," I meant, a sympathetically- and humanely-portrayed member of the honest lower class, i.e. in Sanford & Son. Not quite sure if this was too opaque a reference.].

So, another question: where do we locate the line between audience discernment and filmmaker's discretion? Certainly the filmmaker should feel at liberty to create Art: but, and this is a topic on which I've touched before (specifically, in my senior Philosophy thesis), what is the intersection between Morally Good Work and Good Art? In that previous work, I strongly advocated for the imposition of moral sanctions on a work of art (humor, in that case), due to both a priori and a posteriori factors that seem to fall in favor of morality being a determining factor for the quality of art.

But the question then becomes one of reasonable doubt, or burden of proof: does the filmmaker (or rapper, other musician, artist, etc.) presume an audience comprised of the Lowest Common (discerning) Denominator, and simply create art that is unabashedly moralizing? In such cases, films become preachy, and subtlety is specifized out of the equation.

But the alternative seems more and more distasteful: choices of presentation content and form are, implicitly, choices to condone audiences' viewing of particular material (for this reason, I recently started but could not finish both Bret Easton Ellis's American Psycho [novel] and Jody Hill's Observe and Report [film]). Previously, I held to a reasonably extremely high view of individual volition: I acknowledged the real occurrence of akrasic mind states, but did not pragmatically concern myself over them. More and more, I regret this: both personally, discovering the truth of the saying that "once seen, you cannot un-see" certain materials; and pragmatically, in terms of furthering social progress and harmony, realizing (as I did when watching Better Luck...) that portrayals of immoral or unconscionable behavior, even when within the framework of a largely critical work, have the potential to grasp the imagination in a much stronger net than I had previously wanted to believe.

Of course, the potential remains: I may merely be particularly weak-minded, an outsider. I am familiar with the major arguments: kids know the difference between DOOM and the halls of their High School, and killing a few hundred digital representations in GTA IV won't lead anyone to the slaughterhouse. In fact, proponents of the gaming industry argue, such artificial violence, far from promoting violence, actually helps those in whom rage and anger have built up to let off some steam, destressing and potentially averting a future tragedy.

Previously, I was highly sympathetic to such claims; in fact, I agreed (as do I still now, though with greater qualification) that freedom of speech was a paramount right. But, as recent developments in the video gaming world have shown, freedom of speech, as with any other freedom, can be abused, not for the sake of art, but for the sake of commerce: in such a case, use of freedom does, I increasingly believe, actually constitute abuse or exploitation of speech, leading to negative social repercussions and, ultimately, indirect disenfranchisement of or disconnection from the Other (whether Otherization occurs by race, gender, or simple emotional distance). That such depictions constitute a legal problem, as statutes currently stand, is highly unlikely, I assume; still, my concern is not with the present legality, but rather the present ethics of the situation and, based on an increasing understanding of the ethical landscape, future policy decisions.

Several other areas remain to be addressed. Among them: a persistent question, so far as I understand, in Asian-American Film Studies is the pragmatic response to limited roles for Asian-American actors: marginalized as "wimpy businessmen... or villains with balls", several Asian-American actors have chosen to play the "villains with balls" (Cary-Hiroyuki Tagawa, The Slanted Screen). It's difficult to blame them; but it's also easy to be troubled by this response, on both sides of the racial divide (Us and Other). The Mortal Kombat villain Shang Tsung is, while not emasculated, possessor of a twisted and villainous strength: it is easy to see in him the same archetype as a Stringer Bell or Avon Barksdale, wealthy, organized, manipulative boogeymen. The choice (and I pray it is a false dichotomy) presented to Asian-American actors seems to be marginalization or villainization: is it a wonder that many chose to be villainized?

And of course, one doesn't have to look far to see why an Asian-American presence was Othered and, subsequently, villainized: the widely-documented phenomenon of Yellow Peril was a racial agenda explicitly furthered by the spread of anti-miscegenation laws in direct response to (among other factors) a fear of competition by the Other.

As a friend commented on one of my several earlier posts, the point is not to find a scapegoat: White American dominance, Asian American complicity, and industry/industrial greed have definitely all played key roles in bringing the place of Asian-Americans in the media to their contemporary position. The point is, however, to find the roots of a pernicious construal of an entire section of American society, to see how it insinuated itself into wider American culture, and to find a healthy, healing, reconciliatory means of mutual affirmation and support.

Racism = alive and well

(image by the talented Gene Yang)

"This past Monday, on Martin Luther King Jr.'s birthday, on the eve of Barack Obama's inauguration, I discovered that the casting of the four leading characters for the upcoming live-action movie, "The Last Airbender" (based on the TV show, “Avatar: The Last Airbender”) had gone entirely to white actors. I want—no, need—to say something about this." - Derek Kim, New Day in Politics, Same Old Racist World on the Silver Screen

"intentionally or not, they are adding another chapter to Hollywood’s long, sordid history of Yellowface. By giving white actors roles that are so obviously Asian - and by stating from the get-go their preference for Caucasians - they tell Asian-Americans that who we are and how we look make us inherently inadequate for American audiences, even in a movie that celebrates our culture. Like the schoolboy who pulls up the corners of his eyes at his "Oriental" classmate, they highlight our otherness." - Gene Luen Yang, The Last Airbender Casting Controversy

""What frustrates us most is that you had this amazing opportunity -- you've got a nation of fans who love this quintessentially Asian story," says Kim. "This could have broken down every barrier in the business, proving you can have an all-Asian cast and score three blockbuster successes. Instead, we just get three more chances to cringe."" - Jeff Yang, Bent Out of Shape

To get involved or read more about the organizing going on around this issue, visit Saving the World with Postage or Racebending.com, where the letter-writing and protest campaigns are centered.

Racism?

On one of my commutes up the hill today, I passed a car with the following bumper sticker plastered across the rear window:

"It is just as racist to vote for a man because he is black as it is to vote against a man because he is black."

I firmly disagree, and here is the reasoning, in brief, behind my disagreement:

-There are two reasons why somebody's race will affect your support of their candidacy: (1) Either you are racist (defined as: you assume people have certain characteristics/qualities, whether positive or negative, simply because of their appearance and heritage), or (2) you believe that their experience of race has colored (ha ha... no.) their growth and point of view.

-I heartily concede that the sticker slogan applies to cases of (1). That is, it is equally racist to vote for a Black person on the assumption that simply being Black makes an individual better than, say, an Asian or White candidate, as it is to not vote for her on the assumption that Blackness, on its own, makes one worse than the alternatives.

-However, the sticker slogan fails in its consideration of (2): that is, that being Black grants a candidate a particular experience, for example, growing up as an ethnic minority in a very racially-charged (if not outright racist) society.

-In the case that (2) obtains, I see no reason that being Black - along with the experience of being Black in America that this brings along - is not a perfectly good (albeit yet insufficient) reason to vote for somebody. It is not racist to think that possessing the experience of being an ethnic minority in America will increase somebody's ability to serve as President.

-The opposite is not true, however. To not vote for somebody solely because of his or her status as a minority in America connotes an evaluation of the minority experience that settles on it as insufficient or detrimental to one's ability to serve as President.

Thoughts? There are arguments above that are highly undeveloped, largely due to time constraints and general laziness regarding rigorous thought post-graduation. Anyone want to push me on this?

Holla.

CSW affairs: An Alumnus Viewpoint

A Public Letter to the Charter School of Wilmington Community.

The high school from which I matriculated, the Charter School of Wilmington ("CSW"), has recently been going through some highly public issues, stemming - as I understand - from personal and professional conflicts between the president (our principal figure), Mr. Ron Russo, and members of the school board. It is a matter that strikes deep into the heart of a community within which I struggled, grew, and lived for four of my most formative years, in which I still feel invested, despite having long since departed.

Background:

These are some of the pertinent details (feel free to skip to section 2, below, if you are familiar with the situation) that I have gathered from second- and third-hand sources (primarily here and here), a vague, if lengthy, public statement by the school board (here), and local newspaper reporting (here and here):

-Some time in the past few years, Russo had an affair with a fellow school employee.

-In February 2008, a complaint over repeated sexual harassment was filed against Russo.

-In July 2008, the school board held a poorly-publicized meeting, one of the purposes of which was to determine Russo's future role at CSW. However, he retained his position: sources disagree as to whether this result came from overwhelming student and parent support or because he agreed to change "inappropriate behaviors" at work.

-The board called another meeting for February 10th, the stated purpose of which was to allow Mr. Russo "an opportunity to meet with the Board in Executive Session to present his responses". The board also released a public statement further explaining this action (the harassment complaint, and noncompliance with the terms of his continued employment), as well as intimating to its intended audience that Russo presents a certain persona to the parents and students of CSW, and another entirely to faculty, board members, etc.

-After the closed Executive meeting, a public meeting was held, at which the board publicly voted to terminate Russo's presidency of CSW, with 7 for, 1 abstaining, and 1 (the parent representative) against. The board remains evasive about the particulars of Russo's transgressions.

Those are the salient facts, so far as I understand. For the moment - beginning tomorrow - the school's daily affairs will be under the guidance of another senior teacher and staff member, serving as interim president until a new president can be found, and this whole mess sorted out.

That's the background, setting the stage; now, for my personal thoughts on the matter.

My thoughts: the Board.

First off, I am not interested in judging the merits and injuries of Russo's particular actions. Indeed, I have to confess my own ignorance of the situation: I have not visited Charter for several months, and I know few, if any, remaining students. This is not about the veracity of the allegations against Russo: this is about the rather messy way that the community - students, parents, faculty, and board - has gone about addressing this whole matter.

My first, and somewhat lesser, concern lies in the general lack of credible information presented to substantiate the board's position: it seems that the board are perfectly willing to make allegations of Russo's indiscretions, but the stated facts do not match up with faculty, student, or parent response. The board, in its statement, claims that

"Mr. Russo presents very different behavior to students and most parents than he does to faculty, staff, and parents. This is very much an adult issue in which his behavior is materially and adversely affecting the workplace of the adults who spend significant time with our students."

First of all, this is confusing: Russo presents different behavior to most parents, than to parents? Perhaps this is true; but, if so, why does my only primary source say that there was "not a single speaker against [Russo]" present at the public meeting of February 10th?

Second, the board is setting itself up as an independent, impartial investigator of Russo's workplace conduct: if so, why is the staff member with whom he had an affair present on the board? Ethics demand, if not outright require, that she recuse herself on this matter. It is no surprise that the board warns parents that Russo is interested in a campaign of disinformation: that is precisely the tactics that have, thus far, been utilized by their side. The effect is a two-horned confusion on the part of outsiders who would otherwise grow involved: we cannot trust the board (they are too invested in this situation), but neither, apparently, can we trust Russo. And, in the absence or open undermining of outside support for Russo, the board possesses the power to make unilateral decisions. There is no check, and no balance.

Also potentially concerning is that another, less-well-publicized conflict in the school term immediately preceding the first attempt at ousting Russo was predicated upon his investigation of one of the board members for an unauthorized (and thereby illegal, according to the titular CSW Charter) expenditure of money. The expenditure? For a PR firm. It seems neat coincidence, then, that the Board's strategy on this current removal of Russo was founded upon a nice bit of public relations work to distance parents and students from Russo, by insinuating his untrustworthiness.

Also interesting is firsthand information that claims conflict between Russo and the Board is no new matter: "this all began three years ago when the board voted to cut all teacher bonuses without cause. The faculty and Russo strongly challenged the board and were shot down. It is only after his challenges that all the trouble began."

But, perhaps, the School Board is right, and Russo has acted unprofessionally (perhaps), immorally (likely), and unethically (?). However, the proper remedy to a bad headmaster is not deposing him by hook or by crook, but to do so professionally, morally, and ethically. The Board's actions may be moral; I do not think they have been either professional or ethical. With regards to ethics, my primary concern is that full disclosure of the history between Russo and certain Board members, and the ethically requisite subsequent recusion of Board members, has not happened. Russo's concerns about the board not only go unanswered, but unaddressed.

With regards to professionalism, the board says they want to keep the school running smoothly. Very well: but a smooth school requires relationships of trust between the guiding body of the school (whether a Board or a head), and disregarding parental and student requests for information is the precise opposite of such a trust. Must they disclose further information? I doubt it. Ought they? Indubitably.

Very well. This, then, is my response to the Board, at least that which I have composed in my few spare moments since this matter has begun: I beg, urge, plead with you to be transparent, for your own good, for the good of the school, and for the good of the students whose education you have chartered. If this requires the sacrifice of some personal dignity, of some of the Rights that the Board holds, still, for Heaven's (or not) sake, be open! It will be best, if likely humbling, and the school community can finally feel comfortable with, and not lorded over by, your corporate body. Ultimately, if or when a new choice for school head is brought in, the community will inevitably consider him or her to be "on their side": the more certain they can be that their interests lie not so far from ours, the smoother the whole deal should go down for all involved.

My thoughts: Student Responses.

On the part of the students, I have seen several sorts of responses, coming via various forms of public discussion. Some sympathize with Mr. Russo; others demonize; and some admit that they cannot know the entire story. All these responses, I must admit, resonate with me to some degree. But I would like to address, primarily, the discussion currently centred around the idea of some sort of "student protest," the most immediate and obvious of which is a "Sit in for information on the termination of Mr. Russo" being organized, at the time of this writing, for the first period tomorrow (Wednesday) morning.

I'm not interested in recounting my personal feelings on the matter at hand (whether the board has been forthcoming with information) - that is covered in the section above. What I am pleasantly surprised about, however, is the proposed reason for this sit-in: not in support of Russo, not in defiance of the Board, but in the interest of acquiring information, so as (I presume) to come, as a community, to a more fair and right-minded understanding of the situation. This is, I think, highly commendable. In fact, it illustrates one of the most valuable and crucial skills that Schools hope to impart: reasoned, objective thinking based on values applied in a real-world test.

This is why I worry about responses - whether from students or recent alumni - that condemn such actions as counterproductive, claiming, in the words of one message board post,

"If this is how we show our support to russo [sic], by rebelling against all he helped to build, even when new leadership takes over, all he work [sic] for seems in vain, no?"

No.

Now, such forms of protest would be in vain if what Russo "helped to build" was an institution simply established to pass on knowledge, to produce competitive students, and to garner a list of acceptances to A-list universities. If so, then, yes. So long as academics continue unimpeded, then, yes, we ought to be pleased with ourselves, and, yes, allow this transition to proceed on its way.

But academics cannot be equated with Learning, and facts and formulae are not the only goals of Education. The purpose of a School is not equal to its rank in the nation, to its college acceptance lists, or even to its students future pursuits. A School, at its best, is in the business of teaching life skills, among whose number we must count both values and virtue, both ethics as well as morals. And what pleases me so about much of the student and alumni response to the executive board's obtuse and occluded process is that it is an ethical response: protesting what seems to be an injustice done, while remaining humble and open to convincing otherwise.

Yes, it is difficult, often, to be ethical; it is certainly inconvenient; it is possibly even wrong to support Mr. Russo in this matter. But this protest, it seems, is not a partisan action: this is not about liking a president, or disliking a man. This is about due process, transparent governance, and proper polity. This is why I, both publically and personally, am in support of this sit-in, and any other future actions carried out in a similar spirit. This is precisely the sort of Test which schools cannot prepare, and only Life can offer: a test of character.

I will not discuss at length other historical protests. But I do not think it ludicrous to draw parallels between this action and those such as the boycotts, the sit-ins, the hunger strikes. It is not ludicrous because, despite the scale of this particular situation's effect being quite different from those others, the Ethics at stake knows no scale: If what has been done is wrong, is Unjust in any meaningful way, then this course of action is unqualifiedly proper. If one hopes to one day practice great virtue, then one must today discharge her or his duty in small ways.

So, to the students, to any alumni who may choose to take part in this: Go. Go! and do not leave, do not stop going, until this matter has been drawn up to the utter satisfaction of your conscience or rational understanding of what the Right Thing is in this instance. It will be inconvenient; it may be difficult; it may even be a little embarrassing, if, as it may turn out, there are many who are not so conscience-stricken as you. But, Go!

-Jason G.L. Chu (CSW '04, Yale '08)

More bailing failed-outs out...

courtesy Don over at blacklodges.com

15,238

15,238 words later, I win at Yale.


A small sample (1 section):

3) A sense of “naughtiness” generated by racist beliefs in conflict with one’s “actual” mores. In my discussion thus far, I have been assuming that racist responses to humor are ethically undesirable so long as the premise that holding racist construals is ethically undesirable is granted. This is an assumption that the reader does not necessarily need to accept: I may be mistaken in associating those who are amused in a racist manner by racist humor with those who are actually racist. I take it that those who would claim me to make this sort of error are picking out, as counterexamples to my claim, that set of people who can laugh at racist jokes in the same way that racists do, but yet, in other areas of their lives, evidence fair, unbiased, and equanimous behaviors. I myself have had several friends, particularly in high school, who were fond of telling explicitly racist jokes, or referring to grossly offensive ethnic stereotypes, and laughed at them in much the same way a racist would, yet whom I am fairly certain were not “actually” racist insofar as they did not construe individuals of other races as inferior to or less human then they themselves.

I suspect that this scenario is somewhat like that which Bergmann refers to as a “sense of ‘naughtiness’ generated by sexist beliefs” (73): “Something is ‘naughty’ for adults when they believe it to be forbidden, prohibited, or not spoken of and they also think that indulging in it or alluding to it is harm[less] fun.” Bergmann, however, does not see a distinction between “actually” sexist humor and “merely naughty” sexist humor: she simply classifies the latter as an instantiation of the former, supposing that one must, at some level, harbor a hidden sexist belief in order to find such humorous content amusing. I think that this sells the argument short, though: Bergmann’s thought is that, to see any sort of racist joke as funny, you have to see it as a racist sees it, which is accomplished by your actually being racist. But my objector do not have to believe that people who derive humor from racist jokes in this way are all closeted racists.

The objector might instead claim that is some way in which one can actually not be a racist (i.e., not actually personally subscribe to any racist beliefs) and yet still find “naughty” racist humor amusing: that is, it may be possible to suspend one’s actual racial ethics for the duration of the enjoyment of a joke, then return to one’s initial ethical stance, with no harm done to anyone in the meanwhile. In fact, if this is possible, it may even be preferable, for the reason that amusement or a good sense of humor, all else held equal, improves one’s quality of life. What is wrong, the objector asks, with just trying to get a laugh, with no political purpose behind it, so long as everyone involved knows that the comedian and his audience are not actually racist?

Under this view, I may harbor no conscious or subconscious construals of superiority or ill-will towards African-Americans, temporarily take on the beliefs of someone who does feel superior or malicious towards African-Americans in order to find some racist joke (such as the poster in B.2) against Blacks amusing, then return to my own non-racist stance. Imagine also that I do so alone, with no chance of another ever discovering my momentary point-of-view shift, and having taken no actions within that that period of time with repercussions for myself or others: where does the ethical harm lie in doing so? It seems as though this might be a sort of best-case scenario: I may stake a claim to strong personal ethics, but also derive amusement in ways that would otherwise conflict with those personal ethics.

I, unlike Bergmann, accept that this situation is, in some way, distinct from the case of an actual racist responding to racist humor; but I am still ethically suspicious of this stance. Morality is generally construed to be consequentialist (i.e., things are wrong because they lead to bad outcomes), intrinsic (i.e., things are wrong for some inherent reason), or some combination of both. Regardless of one’s specific meta-ethics, however, I find it difficult to condone such behaviors as outlined above.

If morality is consequentialist, then my ethical concern centers around the claim that one’s actions in adopting, even briefly, the point of view of a racist, can actually have no consequences. Perhaps there are no direct ethical ramifications resulting from my amusement at the racist joke: I will likely not, for example, physically or verbally abuse or disenfranchise any Black individuals during the time I was feeling amusement at that joke. However, morality does not only concern itself with making one-shot moral judgments (“this joke at this time is wrong/right”), but also with the long-term effects of ethical choices in shaping one’s character and aesthetics: “I ought to make choices such that I become this sort of person,” or, in the case of humor, “I ought to/ought not be the sort of person who is amused by these types of jokes.” The role of morality as regards humor lies not only in evaluating an individual instance of a joke as harmful or harmless, but also in shaping an individual’s character such that she becomes the sort of person who finds racist jokes unamusing.

The root of this concern lies in the possibility that taking up a racist view, even in jest, might lead to actual desensitization towards that particular kind of racism. This is a controversial charge, and I have found myself, over the past few years, alternately accepting and questioning it. Certainly, I accept that one’s sense of humor can change. Growing up, I found certain things hilarious; after learning of new things, or simply through mental maturation, I realized that I no longer find those prior amusements hilarious. One’s humorous aesthetic can change, and it is overly simplistic[1] to say that such changes are out of our control. It is generally (though not universally) accepted that same way that upbringing received from one’s parents or other elements of one’s childhood environment (“nurture”) can balance out the effects of one’s natural tendencies (“nature”) in shaping one’s character. Similarly, find it reasonable to claim that a man who makes an ethical judgment that his sense of humor is “naturally” lacking can make moral choices to “nurture” a better aesthetic within himself. If this is so, it then falls well within the realm of morality to demand that an individual moral agent does, to some degree, attempt to effect character change on himself, and one of the best means by which such changes might be effected is through a forced separation from ethically questionable material, despite its retained potential for aesthetic fulfillment.

My critic might here interject that I am demanding more ethical stringency from an everyday moral comic audience member than the finest scholars: for certainly historians, biographers, authors, thespians, and other such academicians place themselves in the shoes of ethically contemptible individuals or characters all the time (imagine C.S. Lewis writing from the perspective of a demon in his Screwtape Letters, or a biographer of Hitler striving to peer through his subject matter’s own eyes). My response is simply that there is something that qualitatively and intentionally distinguishes between the scholarly adoption of a “purely academic” point of view for discussion or research and a viewpoint willingly adopted for reasons of seeking the emotive response of amusement: the concept of scholarly detachment, or a “purely academic” hypothetical question has been promoted precisely because of the need to separate the work of a scholar in exploring potentially unethical points of view from her own personal point of view. To wit, while an academic hypothetical may remain intellectual only, and otherwise unemotional, the danger of emotive responses is precisely that they are affective and emotional, affecting areas of the psyche in which it is far harder to remain divested: I am not even clear on what it means to experience an emotion “hypothetically”, which is very nearly what my critic is claiming a non-racist may do in experiencing amusement elicited by racist construals.

I have a second concern, about the intrinsic harmfulness of such points of view: Roberts, in his 1991, makes the point that “the sinfulness of the emotions is independent of the evil or absurdity of their manifestations” (quoting Harre, 13). Despite a “widespread notion among philosophers that feelings… are not the sort of thing that can be morally assessed,” Roberts evaluates the sort of emotions “that go by such names as ‘envy,’ ‘pride,’… ‘contempt, ‘self-righteousness’… and the like” as inherently censurable, “in themselves… morally offensive” (22). Roberts’s concerns regarding these emotions arise from considering them from the point of view of a family of moralities with the shared trait of highly valuing interpersonal relationships: friendships, brother- and sister- hood, and the like. Within such moral structures, Roberts argues, one’s ethical duty “is constituted not just of behavior of an appropriate kind, but of proper attitudes, and it is these attitudes that are above all contradicted in the wicked feelings [emphasis added]” (22).

The same point translates to racist construals: if one believes morality to be inherently derived, then allowing one’s self to be “temporarily racist” is no better than being “actually racist”. And, presupposing the immorality of racism, it is also immoral to adopt racist beliefs and racially-motivated attitudes of superiority towards others, regardless of whether one does so because of a belief that it is true or simply because it allows one to derive amusement from a particular joke, regardless of whether one does so for a shorter or longer period of time, and regardless of its impact (or lack thereof) on one’s actions and later thoughts. The later reversibility of one’s mental stance it does not alter the fact that one is presently engaging in that particular attitude or construal of other races, and this is in itself morally questionable. If morality about racism is intrinsic, then there are certain racist construals that ought not be accepted, even if only hypothetically and in jest.[2]

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[1] A claim that requires support.

[2] The point can be made that there may be a substantive distinction between “being racist” and “pretending to be racist”, in a way such that whatever is inherently wrong about “being racist” is not wrong with “pretending to be racist”. I suspect, though, that Roberts’ paper again provides a response: in the same way that “being a moral friend” involves not only actually acting morally towards one’s friends, but also holding proper attitudes towards those friends, I think that “being non-racist” involves strictly holding non-racist construals of those other races. Given space constraints, however, I have chosen to not include full discussion on this point in this paper.